Modeling Toll Lanes and Dynamic Pricing Control by Dorogush, Elena G. & Kurzhanskiy, Alex A.
Modeling Toll Lanes and Dynamic Pricing Control
Elena G. Dorogush and Alex A. Kurzhanskiy
September 19, 2018
Abstract
In this paper we address the problem of dynamic pricing for toll lanes on freeways. The proposed toll
mechanism is broken up into two parts: (1) the supply side feedback control that computes the desired
split ratios for the incoming traffic flows between the general purpose and the toll lanes; and (2) the
demand side price setting algorithm that aims to enforce the computed split ratios.
The split ratio controller is designed and tested in the context of the link-node Cell Transmission
Model with the modified node model of in/out flow distribution. The equilibrium structure of this traffic
model is presented; and the case, in which the existence of a toll lane is meaningful, is discussed.
For the price setting, two alternative approaches are presented. The first one is commonly used, and
it relies on the known Value of Time (VoT) distribution. Its shortcoming, however, is in the difficulty of
the VoT distribution estimation. The second approach employs the auction mechanism, where travelers
make bids on places in the toll lane. The advantage of this approach is that it enables direct control over
how many vehicles will be allowed into the toll lane.
Keywords: congestion pricing, toll lanes, feedback traffic control, value of time, Cell Transmission Model,
CTM equilibria
1 Introduction
Congestion pricing is an economics concept of using pricing mechanisms to charge the users of public roads
for the negative effect on others generated by the demand in excess of available supply. It is one of a
number of demand side traffic management strategies that address traffic congestion. Other known demand
management strategies include: parking restrictions; park and ride facilities allowing parking at a distance
and continuation by public transport or ride sharing; reduction of road capacity to force traffic onto other
travel modes; road space rationing, where regulatory restrictions prevent certain types of vehicles from
driving under certain circumstances or in certain areas; and policy approaches, which encourage greater use
of existing alternatives through promotion, subsidies or restrictions.
Our focus will be on congestion pricing for Express Toll Lanes (ETL) and High Occupancy/ Toll (HOT)
lanes. This type of facilities becomes ever more popular in the U.S. In San Francisco Bay Area alone, the
Metropolitan Transportation Commission promises the implementation of 550-mile express lane network by
2035, and all of it with dynamic pricing strategies.
There were numerous studies on congestion pricing over the past two decades. Optimal tolls under stochastic
user equilibria were devised in [29]. Deterministic static equilibrium model for urban transport networks
with elastic demand and capacity constraints was presented in [12]. Optimization of tunnel tolls in Hong
Kong was investigated in [39]. Yang and Bell talked about road pricing in the presence of congestion delay
[38]. Other models of congestion toll were discussed in [15]. Wie and Tobin presented two pricing models —
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one static with the same day-to-day demand and road network capacity, and the other one with time varying
traffic conditions and congestion tolls [37]. Bottleneck model with elastic demand was described in [1]. The
model of bottleneck congestion was generalized and optimal peak-load toll was derived in [24]. Eliasson
suggested optimal road pricing policy reducing aggregate travel time and distributing toll burden equally
among travelers, although travelers had utlity functions with constant marginal utilities of time and money,
and these marginal utilities were unobservable [11]. The second best pricing policy for a static transportation
network, where not all links could be tolled, was presented in [35]. De Palma and Lindsey derived the optimal
tolls formulae and analyzed them to reveal the separate influences of traveler heterogeneity, road network
effects, fiscal effects and equity concerns [8]. In [36] the properties of various types of public and private
pricing on a congested road network were explored, and it was shown that welfare-maximizing pricing was
more efficient than the revenue-maximizing one. Game theoretical analysis of congestion pricing from its
micro-foundations, interaction of two or more travelers, was performed in [20]. Simulation based analysis of
various road pricing schemes was conducted in [7]. The analytical formulation of the optimal toll calculation
for multi-class traffic was given in [16]. In [10] two dynamic pricing strategies, reactive (feedback) and
proactive (feedforward) were considered and compared, favoring the latter. A comprehensive review of the
current congestion pricing technologies was offered in [9].
It is important to mention the research targeted specifically at the dynamic pricing of managed toll lanes. A
local feedback strategy for setting tolls is proposed in [42]. The control algorithm is similar to ALINEA [25],
where the portion of vehicle flow allowed into the toll lane for a given time step is computed from the toll
vehicle flow at the previous time step and the speed observed in the toll and the general purpose lanes. In the
situation when the speed in the toll lane drops below 45 mph, the congestion in the toll lane is assumed, and
tolls are increased quicker than otherwise. Proactive dynamic pricing methodology is described in [23]. Tolls
are determined based on the cell transmission model (CTM) with stochastic demand and capacity. The road
configuration with a single decision point is considered. A distance-based dynamic pricing strategy for toll
lanes aimed at maximizing toll revenue is presented in [40]. Here the tolls are set based on the travel time
prediction that is computed using the stochastic variation of the LWR model [3, 21, 27]. The optimization
problem maximizing the expected toll revenue with constraints keeping the toll lane in free flow is solved.
Yin and Lou delivered the proof of concept of a reactive self-learning approach for determining time-varying
tolls in response to the detected traffic arrivals [41]. The approach learns in a sequential fashion motorists’
willingness to pay and then determines pricing strategies based on a point-queue model. This result was
extended in [22], where the CTM was used instead of the point-queue model, and tolls are set based on the
predicted traffic state. These papers assume that toll lane should be kept in free flow, and the corresponding
constraints are imposed. The logit model is used to implement the driver’s lane choice.
In this paper, we approach dynamic pricing control from both, the supply and the demand sides with the
main focus on the supply side. The supply side control is considered in the context of the Cell Transmission
Model (CTM) [6] with the node model proposed in [31]. Here we extend the result of [14] by analyzing the
equilibrium structure of the freeway traffic model with a single mainline, similarly to [14], but for a different
node model. Then, we discuss when it makes sense to split the mainline into two lanes, the general purpose
and the toll lanes, where the toll lane is supposed to be less congested than the general purpose one. It is
important to note that activating a toll lane is not always beneficial for the freeway performance. Obviously,
when the traffic density is low, a toll lane does not provide any advantage in terms of travel time and, thus,
should be free. On the other hand, when the freeway is too congested, maintaining a toll lane in free flow
may be harmful, as it will lead to large congestion spillback and degrade the throughput. We propose a
supply side control algorithm that computes split ratios dividing the incoming flows between the general
purpose and the toll lanes. Its goal is to keep the toll lane in free flow as long as possible, then, in the case
of continuing excessive demand, allow the toll lane to congest up to the point when the toll lane becomes
a general purpose lane in terms of its performance. When the congestion recedes, the control algorithm
ensures that the toll lane frees up first. The objective is to maintain the same throughput as in the freeway
with all lanes being general purpose. The idea of this control algorithm is inspired by the HERO coordinated
ramp metering [26]. While in the case of ramp metering ramps are used as storage for the excess demand,
the general purpose lane serves as the storage for the split ratio control. All proofs are given in the context
of the proposed traffic model. Once the desired flow splits are computed by the split ratio controller, we
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achieve them by setting the toll rate — that is already a demand management. The common way of setting
the price is to rely on the Value of Time (VoT) distribution [2], which is assumed to be known. Relying
on the VoT distribution, though, makes our control indirect, as we can only estimate how much travelers
are ready to pay. The alternative solution is to use the truthful auction, which we propose as a means of
ensuring the desired split ratios.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the traffic model, describes its equilibrium
structure and splitting the mainline into the general purpose and the toll lanes. Section 3 presents the split
ratio control algorithm and provides examples. Section 4 is dedicated to pricing mechanisms, discussing the
estimation of VoT distribution and proposing the auction algorithm as an alternative. The simulation of
Interstate 680 South in Contra Costa County in California is discussed in Section 5. Ultimately, Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 Traffic Model
A road network is modeled by a directed graph G = (E, V ), where E is the set of edges (links), V is the
set of vertices (nodes). A link e ∈ E is an ordered pair of nodes: e = (u, v), u, v ∈ V . In(v) denotes the set
of incoming links of node v, Out(v) denotes the set of outgoing links of node v. Links without predecessors
(whose begin nodes have no inputs) are called entrances. Links without successors (whose end nodes have
no outputs) are called exits. Links other than entrances and exits are referred to as inner links. By Ein and
Eout we denote the set of entrances and the set of exits, and assume that Ein ∩Eout = ∅. Nodes correspond
to road intersections, merges, diverges, or subdivide longer links into smaller ones.
Every inner link or exit e has the following characteristics, also known as a fundamental diagram:
Ne maximum number of vehicles in the link,
Fe capacity (in vehicles per time step),
ve free flow speed,
we congestion wave speed.
For entrances only capacity and free flow speed need to be defined. The free flow speed and the congestion
speed are measured in link per time step, 0 < ve, we < 1.
Link e at time t contains ne(t) vehicles. Define the outflow demand, or the required outflow, of link e ∈ E
at time t as fde (t) = min{vene(t), Fe}. Define the inflow supply, or the maximum inflow, of link e ∈ E \ Ein
at time t as fse (t) = min{we(Ne − ne(t)), Fe}. The number of vehicles in link e = (u, v) at time t+ 1 is
ne(t+ 1) = ne(t) + f
in
e (t)− foute (t), (2.1)
where f ine (t) is the total incoming flow for link e at time t:
f ine (t) =
∑
e1∈In(u)
fe1,e(t), e ∈ E \ Ein, (2.2)
the incoming flow f ine (t) for every entrance e ∈ Ein is given; foute (t) is the total outgoing flow for link e at
time t:
foute (t) =
∑
e2∈Out(v)
fe,e2(t), e ∈ E \ Eout, (2.3)
the outgoing flow for exits e ∈ Eout equals the outflow demand: foute (t) = fde (t).
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Flows fe1,e2(t) between adjacent links e1, e2, are determined by a node model that should satisfy the following
conditions: (1) all flows between adjacent nodes fe1,e2(t) are non-negative; (2) incoming flows don’t exceed
inflow supplies, except for entrances, f ine (t) ≤ fse (t), e ∈ E \ Ein; and (3) outgoing flows don’t exceed
outflow demands, foute (t) ≤ fde (t), e ∈ E.
Conservation law (2.1) and the flow constraints ensure that if the number of vehicles at time t in each
link ne(t) is positive and less than the maximum number of vehicles Ne (that is, ne(t) ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E and
ne(t) ≤ Ne for all e ∈ E \ Ein), then the same holds for the next time step t+ 1 (namely, ne(t+ 1) ≥ 0 for
e ∈ E, and ne(t + 1) ≤ Ne for e ∈ E \ Ein). Moreover, if an exit link e ∈ Eout, is in a free flow state at
time t, vene(t) ≤ Fe, then it will stay in a free flow state at time t+ 1: vene(t+ 1) ≤ Fe.
2.1 Node Model
We use the node model proposed in [31]. Consider node v with m incoming and n outgoing links, m,n > 0.
Let fdi (t) be an outflow demand of the ith incoming link at time t, and fsj (t) be an inflow supply of the jth
outgoing link at time t as shown in Figure 1.
fdi (t)
fsj (t)v
Figure 1: Node of a road network graph.
Let fij(t) be the flow from the ith incoming to the jth outgoing link. A node model determines flows fij(t)
from demands fdi (t), supplies fsj (t), a split ratio matrix Bv(t) ∈ Rm×n and priorities of the incoming links
pi ≥ 0. [31] proposed that the priorities pi should be proportional to capacities Fi of the incoming links.
Alternatively, the priorities pi can be proportional to demands fdi (t), as suggested in [17] and implemented
in [19].
Elements of the split ratio matrix Bv(t) = {βij(t)}j=1,...,ni=1,...,m are nonnegative, and
∑n
j=1 βij(t) = 1. The split
ratio matrix imposes the First-In-First-Out (FIFO) constraint on the flows fij(t):
fij1(t)
βij1(t)
=
fij2(t)
βij2(t)
. (2.4)
Priority coefficients of the incoming links, pi, affect flows fij(t), if a supply of some outgoing link is too small
to accommodate a demand from the incoming links. This will be clarified later.
We now describe the algorithm for finding flows fij . To simplify the notation, the time step t is omitted.
The Algorithm
1. Compute oriented demands fdij = fdi βij and directed priorities pij = piβij , i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 1, . . . , n.
2. Define sets J(1), Vj(1), and supply residuals f˜sj (1), j ∈ J(1):
J(1) = {j : ∑mi=1 fdij > 0};
Vj(1) = {i : fdij > 0};
f˜sj (1) = f
s
j .
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Clearly, fij = 0 if j /∈ J(1).
Sets Vj(k) defined at each step k are the sets of incoming links i such that flows fij are still to be
defined. J(k) is a set of outgoing links j such that Vj(k) 6= ∅. The supply residual f˜sj (k) is the inflow
supply of link j to be distributed among incoming links in Vj(k).
3. Set k ← 1.
4. If J(k) = ∅, stop.
5. For each j ∈ J(k) compute a reduction factor
aj(k) =
f˜sj (k)∑
i∈Vj(k) pij
.
Determine the minimum of {aj(k)}j∈J(k): aˆ(k) = aˆ(k)(k) = minj∈J(k) aj(k).
6. Define U(k) = {i ∈ Vˆ(k)(k) : fdi ≤ aˆ(k)pi}. It’s a set of incoming links such that their outflow demand
does not exceed the rightful share in the inflow supply of the remaining outgoing links.
(a) If U(k) 6= ∅, then for all i ∈ U(k), j = 1, . . . , n, set fij = fdij , and compute
Vj(k + 1) = Vj(k) \ U(k), j ∈ J(k);
J(k + 1) = {j ∈ J(k) : Vj(k + 1) 6= ∅};
f˜sj (k + 1) = f˜
s
j (k)−
∑
i∈U(k) f
d
ij , j ∈ J(k + 1).
(b) If U(k) = ∅, then for all i ∈ Vˆ(k)(k), j = 1, . . . , n, set fij = aˆ(k)pij , and compute
Vj(k + 1) = Vj(k) \ Vˆ(k)(k), j ∈ J(k);
J(k + 1) = {j ∈ J(k) : Vj(k + 1) 6= ∅};
f˜sj (k + 1) = f˜
s
j (k)−
∑
i∈Vˆ(k)(k) aˆ(k)pij , j ∈ J(k + 1).
Note that ˆ(k) /∈ J(k + 1).
7. Set k ← k + 1, and go to step 4.
The first 3 steps are initialization steps. As explained in [31], in each iteration we define the reduction
factors aj (step 5), which the incoming flows competing for the remaining supply of the jth outgoing link
should be set proportional to, if they were not constrained by the demand of the corresponding incoming
link, so fij = ajpij . Then, a minimum of aj , denoted by aˆ, whose index is ˆ, is selected and imposed on all
incoming links from Vˆ. If some links are found to be demand-constrained (case 6a), their outgoing flow is
set equal to demand, and those demand-constrained links U are removed from every Vj . Otherwise (case 6b)
the flows from Vˆ are supply-constrained with factor aˆ, and all links from Vˆ are removed from every Vj . The
algorithm stops when all flows have been defined. Since at least one incoming link is removed from all Vj in
each iteration, the algorithm finishes after at most m iterations.
2.2 Freeway Model
The model of a freeway without toll lanes described below is a combination of the Cell Transmission Model
for networks, similar to [6], and the node model proposed in [31] and explained above.
A freeway network consists of mainline links, entrance links (mostly on-ramps), and exit links (mostly off-
ramps). Links are connected to each other by nodes. Nodes correspond to junctions, merge and diverge
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points, and are also used to split long links into shorter ones. When a freeway network is built for simulation,
nodes are typically placed so as to keep link lengths in the range between .1 and .2 miles.
The characteristics of the ith mainline link are: its capacity Fi, the maximum number of vehicles it can
contain Ni, a free flow speed vi and a congestion speed wi. The capacity is measured in vehicles per time
step, while both speeds are measured in link per time step, 0 < vi, wi < 1. The freeway contains K links,
numbered from 1 to K, the entrance link numbered 0, and the exit link numbered K + 1. Additionally,
there may be an on-ramp with capacity Ri and free flow speed vri < 1 attached to the beginning of mainline
link i, and an off-ramp with capacity Si at the end of the ith link, i = 1, . . . ,K. If there is no on-ramp at
the beginning of the ith link, then Ri = 0.
We now clarify how the model parameters, such as capacities and speeds, are normalized, that is, how the
speeds measured in miles per hour are converted into the speeds measured in link per time step, and how
the capacities measured in vehicles per hour per lane are converted into the capacities measured in vehicles
per time step. Suppose Li is the length of mainline link i measured in miles, τ is the time step measured
in hours, Vi is the free flow speed in link i measured in miles per hour, Wi is the congestion speed in link i
measured in miles per hour, Ci is the capacity of link i measured in vehicles per hour per lane, ki is the
number of lanes in link i. Then vi = Viτ/Li, wi = Wiτ/Li, Fi = Cikiτ . The speeds vri and the capacities
Ri, Si are normalized in the same way. Hence the aforementioned inequalities vi, wi < 1 are equivalent
to max{Vi,Wi} τ/Li < 1, which is the Courant — Friedrichs — Lewy condition (see [5]). For example, if
the minimum link length Li is 0.2 miles, the maximum free flow speed vi is 60 mph, and the maximum
congestion speed wi is 50 mph, then the maximum time step τ is 0.2/60 hours, which is 12 seconds.
ni−1 ni
qi
ni+1
qi+1
Figure 2: Freeway model.
Denote ni(t) the number of vehicles in link i at time t. We assume that if the ith link is uncongested, that is,
vini(t) ≤ Fi, then the number of vehicles it contains doesn’t influence the incoming flow for this link at
time t, that is, wi(Ni − ni(t)) ≥ Fi. This assumption is equivalent to the following inequality:
Fi
vi
+
Fi
wi
≤ Ni. (2.5)
Denote di(t) the demand, or desired flow, at the ith on-ramp; ri(t) — the actual flow coming from on-ramp
i to link i; and qi(t) — the number of vehicles queued at the ith on-ramp, at time t. Both flows, di(t) and
ri(t) are measured in vehicles per time step. Clearly,
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t) + di(t)− ri(t). (2.6)
Denote fi(t) the flow from link i to link (i + 1); and si(t) — the flow from link i to the corresponding
off-ramp. The number of vehicles in mainline links evolves as:
ni(t+ 1) = ni(t) + fi−1(t) + ri(t)− fi(t)− si(t). (2.7)
As for the entrance link 0 and the exit link K + 1, the same equality holds, except ri(t) = si(t) = 0,
i = 0,K + 1.
Since every exit remains in a free flow state once it’s there, there is no need to take the state of exits
into consideration: assuming that all exits, including link K + 1, are initially in a free flow state, and that
inequality (2.5) holds, flows from mainline links to the exits are only constrained by the exit capacities.
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Off-ramp flow si(t) is proportional to the flow to the downstream link fi(t): there exist split ratios β
f
i , β
s
i ,
such that βfi > 0, β
s
i ≥ 0, βfi + βsi = 1,
fi(t)
βfi
=
si(t)
βsi
. (2.8)
If link i has no off-ramp, let βsi = 0, β
f
i = 1.
Denote F si = Fi, i = 1, . . . ,K + 1, F d0 = F0,
F di =
{
Fi, β
s
i = 0,
βfi min{Fi, Si/βsi }, βsi > 0,
i = 1, . . . ,K + 1. (2.9)
F si is the “inflow capacity” of the ith mainline link, that is, the maximum incoming flow if the link has
enough space for them. F di is the “outflow capacity” of the ith mainline link, that is, the maximum number
of vehicles which can move from this link to link i+ 1 per time step if link i+ 1 has enough space for them.
By introducing the outflow capacity we ensure that the off-ramp flow si(t) = (βsi /β
f
i )fi(t) never exceeds the
off-ramp capacity Si if the downstream flow fi(t) does not exceed the outflow capacity F di :
si(t) =
βsi
βfi
fi(t) ≤ β
s
i
βfi
F di ≤ Si. (2.10)
The incoming flows d(t) and f−1(t) are given, other flows are determined by the node model (see Figure 3).
For each node compute outflow demands for the on-ramp rdi (t) (if present) and the incoming (upstream)
mainline link fdi−1(t), and inflow supply for the outgoing (downstream) mainline link fsi (t):
fsi (t) = min{wi(Ni − ni(t)), F si }, i = 1, . . . ,K + 1, (2.11)
fdi (t) = min{βfi vini(t), F di }, i = 0, . . . ,K + 1, (2.12)
rdi (t) = min{vri qi(t), Ri}, i = 1, . . . ,K. (2.13)
Let rdK+1(t) = 0. Note that f
s
K+1(t) = F
s
K+1.
fdi−1, p
f
i−1
rdi , p
r
i
fsi
Si−1
Figure 3: Freeway node.
The flow out of exit link K + 1 equals the outflow demand, fK+1(t) = fdK+1(t). The flow from the last
mainline link K to the exit link K + 1 is a minimum of the outflow demand of the upstream link and the
inflow supply of the downstream link: fK(t) = min{fdK(t), fsK+1(t)}.
Priorities of mainline links pfi , i = 0, . . . ,K − 1, and priorities of on-ramps pri , i = 1, . . . ,K, are given,
Suppose the priorities are normalized: pfi−1 + p
r
i = 1. For each i = 1, . . . ,K compute fi−1(t) and ri(t) as
follows.
1. If the downstream mainline link can accomodate the demand from the on-ramp and the upstream link,
fdi−1(t) + r
d
i (t) ≤ fsi (t), then the actual flows equal the demands: fi−1(t) = fdi−1(t), ri(t) = rdi (t).
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2. Otherwise, if the outflow demand from upstream mainline link does not exceed its rightful share in the
inflow supply of the downstream link, fdi−1(t) ≤ pfi−1fsi (t), then the flow from the upstream link equals
the demand, fi−1(t) = fdi−1(t), and the flow from the on-ramp takes up the residual of the supply:
ri(t) = f
s
i (t)− fdi−1(t).
3. Otherwise, if the outflow demand from the on-ramp doesn’t exceed its rightful share in the supply,
rdi (t) ≤ pri fsi (t), then, analogously, ri(t) = rdi (t), fi−1(t) = fsi (t)− rdi (t).
4. Otherwise fdi−1(t) > p
f
i−1f
s
i (t) and rdi (t) > pri fsi (t). In this case the flows are proportional to the
priorities: ri(t) = pri fsi (t), fi−1(t) = p
f
i−1f
s
i (t).
These rules are derived from the general node model presented in subsection 2.1. Note that since fi−1(t) ≤
fdi−1(t) ≤ F di−1, the off-ramp flow si−1(t) = (βsi−1/βfi−1)fi−1(t) does not exceed the off-ramp capacity Si−1
for the reasons mentioned after equation (2.9). Thus, both supply constraints — from the downstream link
and from the off-ramp — are satisfied.
2.3 Equilibria of the Freeway Model
Suppose the incoming flows f−1 and d are constant, as well as priorities p
f
i , p
r
i and split ratios β
f
i , β
s
i . We say
that a triple (n, f, r) is an equilibrium, if vK+1nK+1 ≤ FK+1 (that is, the exit link (K + 1) is uncongested)
and there exist queue lengths n0, qi, i = 1, . . . ,K, such that if ni(t) = ni, i = 1, . . . ,K, n0(t) = n0, and
q(t) = q, then f(t+ ∆t) = f , ni(t+ ∆t) = ni, i = 1, . . . ,K, and r(t+ ∆t) = r for all ∆t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Note
that queue lengths n0, q are not included in the equilibrium. Queue lengths either stay constant or grow at
a rate of (f−1 − f0) or (di − ri) vehicles per time step.
Define maximum flows f¯0 = min{f−1, F0}, r¯i = min{di, Ri},
f¯i = min{βfi (f¯i−1 + r¯i), F di }, i = 1, . . . ,K + 1. (2.14)
It can be shown that inequalities ri ≤ r¯i, i = 1, . . . ,K, and fi ≤ f¯i, i = 0, . . . ,K + 1, hold for every
equilibrium (n, f, r).
Theorems 2.1, 2.2 fully characterize the set of all equilibria corresponding to the incoming flows f−1, d.
Theorem 2.1. Equilibrium flows r and f are uniquely defined. Namely, fK+1 = f¯K+1, and flows fi−1, ri
are uniquely determined by fi, i = K + 1, . . . , 1, as follows.
1. If f¯i−1 ≤ pfi−1fi/βfi , then fi−1 = f¯i−1, ri = fi/βfi − f¯i−1.
2. If r¯i ≤ pri fi/βfi , then ri = r¯i, fi−1 = fi/βfi − r¯i.
3. Otherwise f¯i−1 > p
f
i−1fi/β
f
i , r¯i > p
r
i fi/β
f
i ; in this case fi−1 = p
f
i−1fi/β
f
i , ri = p
r
i fi/β
f
i .
Note that this rule is similar to that in the node model. Again, the off-ramp capacity constraints are not
violated due to the reasons mentioned after equation (2.9) and the fact that f ≤ f¯ ≤ F d.
Theorem 2.1 follows from lemma 2.1 and the node model.
Lemma 2.1. If fi < f¯i, then fi < fdi .
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Lemma 2.1 is purely technical, the proof is omitted.
Once the equilibrium flows r and f are known, the set E of equilibrium density vectors n is defined as follows.
Let I = {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ K, fi = F di }∪{i : 1 ≤ i ≤ K, fi+ ri+1 = F si+1}. The set I is in fact a set of bottlenecks,
since for all i /∈ I fi < F di and fi < F si+1 − ri+1. Suppose I = {i1, . . . , iM}, i1 < i2 < · · · < iM , M = |I|.
Assume i0 = 0. Let
Im = {i : im−1 < i ≤ im}, m = 1, . . . ,M, (2.15)
IM+1 = {i : iM < i ≤ K + 1}. (2.16)
If I = ∅, then IM+1 = I1 = {1, . . . ,K + 1}. The set Im, m ∈ {2, . . . ,M}, contains all links between
the bottleneck im−1 and the downstream bottleneck im, including the downstream bottleneck. The set
IM+1 contains links downstream of the last bottleneck iM , the set I1 contains links upstream of the first
bottleneck i1.
Let
nui = n
u
i (r, f) =
fi
βfi vi
, nci = n
c
i (r, f) = Ni −
ri + fi−1
wi
, i = 1, . . . ,K + 1. (2.17)
Letters u and c here mean uncongested and congested. We claim that nu ≤ nc whenever fi = βfi (ri+fi−1) ≤
F di . Indeed, this follows from inequality (2.5):
nui =
fi
βfi vi
≤ F
d
i
βfi vi
≤ Fi
vi
≤ Ni − Fi
wi
≤ Ni − F
d
i
βfi wi
≤ Ni − ri + fi−1
wi
= nci . (2.18)
Define sets
U = {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1, fi < F di , fi/pfi < ri+1/pri+1}, (2.19)
C = {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ K, ri < r¯i, fi−1 + ri < F si } ∪ {1, if f0 < f¯0, f0 + r1 < F s1 }. (2.20)
U is the set of uncongested links: ni = nui for i ∈ U ; C is the set of congested links: ni = nci for i ∈ C.
These conditions can be obtained directly from the node model. For m = 1, . . . ,M define indices
ium =
{
im−1, Im ∩ U = ∅,
max(Im ∩ U), Im ∩ U 6= ∅,
icm =
{
im + 1, Im ∩ C = ∅,
min(Im ∩ C), Im ∩ C 6= ∅.
(2.21)
It can be shown that ium < icm for each m = 1, . . . ,M .
Theorem 2.2. The set E of equilibrium vectors n is a direct product of sets Em corresponding to sets Im:
E =
M+1⊗
m=1
Em. (2.22)
The set EM+1 consists of a single vector,
EM+1 = {(nuiM+1, . . . , nuK+1)}. (2.23)
The set Em, m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} either consists of a single vector,
Em = {(nuim−1+1, . . . , nuium , ncicm , . . . , ncim)}, if ium = icm − 1, (2.24)
or is a union
Em =
icm−1⋃
h=ium+1
Ehm, (2.25)
where
Ehm = {(nuim−1+1, . . . , nuh−1, nh, nch+1, . . . , ncim), nuh ≤ nh ≤ nch}. (2.26)
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Figure 4: Structure of equilibrium vector n.
The proof of theorem 2.2 for U = ∅ and C = ∅ can be found in [14].
Figure 4 illustrates theorem 2.2.
Note that the equilibrium flows and densities and thus the queue growth depend on priorities pf , pr. One
extreme case, pri = 1, p
f
i = 0 for all i, is fully studied by [14]. Another extreme case is p
r
i = 0, p
f
i = 1 for
all i. In this case all non-bottleneck links are uncongested, whereas the on-ramp just upstream of the last
bottleneck is more congested than for any strictly positive on-ramp priorities pr.
2.3.1 Feasible and infeasible incoming flows
Flows fi, i = 1, . . . ,K + 1, are uniquely defined by flows from entrances f0 and ri, i = 1, . . . ,K, because the
equality fi = β
f
i (fi−1 + ri) holds for all i = 1, . . . ,K. Namely,
fi(f0, r) = f0
i∏
k=1
βfk +
i∑
j=1
rj
i∏
k=j
βfk , i = 1, . . . ,K + 1. (2.27)
The incoming flow (f−1, d) is said to be feasible, if fi(f¯0, r¯) ≤ F di , i = 1, . . . ,K + 1, and infeasible otherwise.
The incoming flow is said to be strictly feasible, if fi(f¯0, r¯) < F di , i = 1, . . . ,K + 1.
It can be demonstrated that if the incoming flow (f−1, d) is feasible, then the equilibrium flows equal
maximum flows, r = r¯, f = f¯ = f(f¯0, r¯), and consequently C = ∅. Moreover, if the incoming flow (f−1, d)
is strictly feasible, then the set E of equilibrium density vectors consists of a single vector, E = {nu}.
2.4 Model of a Freeway with Toll Lanes
We model a freeway with toll lanes by splitting each mainline link into two parallel ones (see Figure 5), the
first one (upper index 1) corresponds to toll lanes, the second one (upper index 2) corresponds to the general
purpose lanes. Each of these two links has a separate exit.
n
1
i−1
n
2
i−1
qi
n
1
i
n
2
i
qi+1
n
1
i+1
n
2
i+1
Figure 5: Model of a freeway with toll lanes.
The capacities and maximum number of vehicles of the resulting links are proportional to the number of
lanes. Let l1 be the number of toll lanes, and l2 be the number of general purpose lanes. Then the capacities
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F 1i = Fil1/(l1 + l2), F 2i = Fil2/(l1 + l2). The maximum number of vehicles N
ξ
i , the maximum flows F
ξ,d
i ,
F ξ,si , and priorities p
ξ,s
i , ξ = 1, 2, are defined in the same manner.
Outflow demands and inflow supplies are defined as in the freeway model:
rdi (t) = min{vri qi(t), Ri}, i = 1, . . . ,K (2.28)
fξ,di (t) = min{βfi vinξi (t), F ξ,di }, ξ = 1, 2, i = 0, . . . ,K + 1, (2.29)
fξ,si (t) = min{wi(Nξi − nξi (t)), F ξ,si }, ξ = 1, 2, i = 1, . . . ,K + 1. (2.30)
Travelers can only choose between the toll and the general purpose lanes when they enter the freeway. The
freeway state and the toll both influence split ratios of the flow from the entrance into the mainline links.
Denote those split ratios by α1i , α2i . Of course, α1i , α2i ≥ 0, α1i + α2i = 1.
f
1,d
i−1, p
1,f
i−1
f
2,d
i−1, p
2,f
i−1
f
1,s
i
f
2,s
i
rdi , p
r
i
S1i−1
S2i−1
Figure 6: Node model of a freeway with toll lanes.
Flows fξ−1(t) are given, flows out of the exit links equal demands: f
ξ
K+1(t) = f
ξ,d
K+1(t). Other flows, namely
fξi−1(t), r
ξ
i (t), i = 1, . . . ,K + 1, are determined by the following node model (see Figure 6). The time step t
is implied, but omitted for simplicity. Compute potential flows ψ1i , ψ2i
ψξi = min
{
max
{
fξ,si
αξi p
r
i
αξi p
r
i + p
ξ,f
i−1
, fξ,si − fξ,di−1
}
, αξi r
d
i
}
, ξ = 1, 2. (2.31)
The potential flow ψ1i is the flow r1i from the entrance to the toll lane of the ith mainline link (according
to the general node model from subsection 2.1), if this flow is not constrained by the general purpose lane.
Such a constraint may arise, as shown later, since the flows r1i , r2i should be proportional to the split ratios
α1i , α2i . Similarly, ψ2i is the flow from the entrance to the general purpose lane of the ith link, if there are no
constraints from the toll lane.
Define
λξi =
{
1, αξi = 0,
ψξi /(α
ξ
i r
d
i ), α
ξ
i > 0,
ξ = 1, 2, (2.32)
and λi = min{λ1i , λ2i }. Clearly, λξi ≤ 1, therefore λi ≤ 1. Finally, compute flows rξi and fξi−1:
rξi = λiα
ξ
i r
d
i , f
ξ
i−1 = min{fξ,di−1, fξ,si − rξi }, ξ = 1, 2. (2.33)
If the freeway is in free flow and the demand is feasible, there is no need in toll lane, because it does not
provide any gain in travel time. On the other hand, if the freeway is in the fully congested equilibrium,
there is no logic in redistributing the incoming flows ri either: even if the toll lane becomes uncongested, the
entrances will accumulate queues, reducing the total output flow of the system and harming everyone. So,
in the case of fully congested freeway, even with feasible flow, there is no use for a toll lane. The situation
when the toll lane is helpful though, is when the freeway segment is partially congested. That is, when
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without reducing the total output flow of the system, toll lane can provide saving in travel time for those
choosing to use it. Figure 7 illustrates this case: assume there is a partially congested freeway segment (see
also Figure 4). Once we divide this segment into the toll and the general purpose lanes, it is possible to
redistribute vehicles between these two lanes so that the general purpose lane acts as a storage for the extra
vehicles, while the toll lane frees up, and all of it retaining the original flows.
toll lane
general purpose lane
Figure 7: Redistributing congestion of a partially congested highway.
The proposed redistribution can be achieved by controlling the split ratios α1i , α2i of the on-ramp flows ri.
This will be explained in the next section.
3 Control of Split Ratios
Here we present an on-ramp flow redistribution control algorithm which aims at bringing the toll lane into
a free flow state and maintaining the free flow state of the toll lane, provided that queues at the entrances
grow as slowly as possible.
For simplicity, assume that the first link does not have an on-ramp, and transform the model in such a way,
that the link 0 becomes an on-ramp of link 1. Thus, there is no 0th link and fξ,s0 (t) ≡ 0, ξ = 1, 2.
We assume that all information about the current freeway state, namely, densities nξi (t) and queue
lengths qi(t), is available. But we know nothing about the future: at time t no information about incoming
flows di(t+ ∆t), ∆t = 0, 1, . . . , is available.
The pricing mechanism for using the toll lane changes split ratios α1i (t), α2i (t). This dependency will be
discussed in section 4. In this section we assume that the split ratios α1i (t), α2i (t) can be set directly.
The algorithm for determining the split ratios of the on-ramp flow ri(t) at time step t is described next. The
time step t is implied, but will be omitted for simplicity.
3.1 Queue Growth Rate Minimization
First, we determine a range of split ratios that minimize the queue growth rate. It only makes sense to
consider such links i, where rdi > 0 and f
1,s
i + f
2,s
i > 0, since otherwise r
1
i = r
2
i = 0.
To minimize the queue growth rate, λ(α1i , α2i ) = min{λ1i (α1i ), λ2i (α2i )} should be maximized. Denote
λ∗i = max
α1i∈[0,1]
λi(α
1
i , 1− α1i ), (3.1)
A1i = arg max
α1i∈[0,1]
λi(α
1
i , 1− α1i ). (3.2)
Our goal is to find A1i .
It can be shown that λξi is a monotonically decreasing function of α
ξ
i , and λ
ξ
i (α
ξ
i ) is continuous at least for
αξi ∈ (0, 1], ξ = 1, 2. Indeed, if αξi ∈ (0, 1], then
λξi (α
ξ
i ) = min
{
max
{
fξ,si
rdi
pri
αξi p
r
i + p
ξ,f
i−1
,
fξ,si − fξ,di−1
αξi r
d
i
}
, 1
}
. (3.3)
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Note that λξi (α
ξ
i ) ≡ 0 for αξi ∈ (0, 1], if pri = 0 and fξ,si ≤ fξ,di−1.
Let
α¯ξi = max{αξi : αξi ∈ [0, 1], λξi (αξi ) = 1}. (3.4)
Clearly, α¯ξi = min{1,max{0, aξi }}, where
aξi =

fξ,si − fξ,di−1
rdi
, pri = 0,
max
{
fξ,si − fξ,di−1
rdi
,
fξ,si
rdi
− p
ξ,f
i−1
pri
}
, pri > 0.
(3.5)
Consider the following cases.
1. α¯1i+α¯2i ≥ 1. In this case λ1i (α1i ) = λ2i (α2i ) = 1 and hence λi(α1i , α2i ) = 1 for α2i = 1−α1i , α1i ∈ [1−α¯2i , α¯1i ].
Thus, A1i = [1− α¯2i , α¯1i ].
2. α¯1i + α¯2i < 1. In this case λi(α1i , α2i ) < 1 for all α1i , α2i ≥ 0, α1i + α2i = 1, therefore, the flow from the
on-ramp is inevitably constrained.
(a) If pri = 0 and f
ξ,s
i ≤ fξ,di−1, ξ = 1, 2, then α¯1i = α¯2i = 0 and λ(α1i , 1 − α1i ) = 0 for all α1i ∈ [0, 1],
therefore A1i = [0, 1].
(b) Assume at least one of the inequalities pri > 0, f
ξ,s
i > f
ξ,d
i−1, ξ = 1, 2, holds.
If λ1i (1− α¯2i ) ≥ limα2→α¯2i+0 λ2i (α2), then A1i = {1− α¯2i }.
If λ2i (1− α¯1i ) ≥ limα1→α¯1i+0 λ1i (α1), then A1i = {α¯1i }.
Otherwise there exists exactly one solution α1,∗i of the equation λ
1
i (α
1
i ) = λ
2
i (1− α1i ), and α1,∗i ∈
(α¯1i , 1− α¯2i ), since λξi (αξi ) is strictly decreasing for αξi ∈ (α¯ξi , 1], ξ = 1, 2. In this case A1i = {α1,∗i }.
So the set A1i is either a segment or a point. The corresponding flow
r1i = r
1
i (α
1
i ) = λi(α
1
i , 1− α1i )α1i rdi (3.6)
belongs to a segment [r1,mini , r
1,max
i ], where r
1,min
i = r
1
i (minA
1
i ), r
1,max
i = r
1
i (maxA
1
i ).
3.2 On-Ramp Flow Redistribution
In order not to redistribute on-ramp flows when the freeway is in a free flow state, introduce the following
correction. If α¯1i + α¯2i > 1 and α¯1i > l1/(l1 + l2) (recall that l1 and l2 are the number of toll and general
purpose lanes), let
α¯1i = max{1− α¯2i , l1/(l1 + l2)}
and recalculate r1,maxi = α¯
1
i r
d
i .
Compute the maximum maintainable level of densities for the toll lane n1,∗. A maintainable level of densities
is a vector n1,∗ corresponding to a free-flow state (βfi vin
1,∗
i ≤ F 1,di , i = 1, . . . ,K), such that if n1(t) ≤ n1,∗
and r1(t) = 0, then n1(t + 1) ≤ n1,∗. The maximum maintainable level of densities n1,∗ is defined as
follows. First, compute flows f1,∗i , i = K + 1, . . . , 1 as follows: f
1,∗
K+1 = F
1
K+1, f
1,∗
i = min{F 1,di , f1,∗i+1/βfi+1},
i = K, . . . , 1. After that, compute densities n1,∗i = f
1,∗
i /(β
f
i vi).
13
Next, define the maximum free-flow equilibrium n1,e. Let M be a number of on-ramps, i1 < i2 < · · · < iM
be the indices of links with on-ramps, i1 = 1 by assumption. Let iM+1 = K + 2. Define f
1,e
im
= f1,∗im ,
f1,ei = β
f
i f
1,e
i−1, i = im + 1, . . . , im+1− 1, n1,ei = f1,ei /(βfi vi). Is is easily shown that f1,e ≤ f1,∗ and n1,e is an
equilibrium corresponding to the on-ramp flow r1,e: r1,eim = f
1,e
im
/βfim − f1,eim−1 ≥ 0. Define
N1,e(im, im+1) =
im+1−1∑
i=im
n1,ei . (3.7)
The controller keeps the total number of vehicles between entrances m and m+ 1 less than N1,e(im, im+1),
and the incoming flow f1im−1 + r
1
im
less than equilibrium flow f1,eim /β
f
im
, if the minimum-queue-growth-rate
constraint permits that.
If we knew flows r1im , deriving split ratios α
1
im
, α2im would be easy: if r
d
im
= 0 or λ∗im = 0, then the on-ramp
flow rim = 0 regardless of split ratios, otherwise α1im = r
1
im
/rim , α2im = 1−α1im , where rim = λ∗imrdim . So, we
need to determine on-ramp flows r1im ∈ [r1,minim , r1,maxim ].
At every time step t, compute the total number of vehicles between every pair of adjacent on-ramps
n1(t, im, im+1) =
∑im+1−1
i=im
n1i (t), estimate flows s1i (t), i = 1, . . . ,K, and f1im−1(t), m = 1, . . . ,M + 1, for
r1im(t) = r
1,min
im
(t). By s˜1i (t) and f˜1im−1(t) denote the estimates.
If f1,dim−1(t) + r
1,max
im
(t) > min{f1,sim (t), f1,eim /βfim}, then to possibly avoid constraining the flow from the up-
stream link fim−1 and exceeding the equilibrium inflow f
1,e
im
/βfim , set
r1,maxim (t) = max{r1,minim (t),min{f1,sim (t), f1,eim /βfim} − f1,dim−1(t)}.
1. Let ∆n = 0, m = M , γM = 1.
Here ∆n is an excess of vehicles in the toll lane, m is the number of current entrance, from M down
to 1, 0 ≤ γm ≤ 1 is a reduction coefficient. If γm is strictly less than 1, it means that some downstream
entrance is unable to reduce congestion in the toll lane on its own. Therefore, we reduce the target
number of vehicles between entrances m and m+1 by γm in order to reduce the flow to the downstream
links.
2. Compute ∆n1(t, im, im+1; γim) = n1(t, im, im+1)− γmN1,e(im, im+1),
∆n← ∆n+ ∆n1(t, im, im+1; γm) + f˜1im−1(t)− f˜1im+1−1(t)−
im+1−1∑
i=im
s˜i(t).
We estimate the excess number of vehicles in the toll lane in links im, . . . , im+1 − 1.
3. Determine r1im(t) = max{r1,minim (t),min{r1,maxim (t),−∆n}}.
The on-ramp flow r1im should reduce the excess number of vehicles, if possible.
4. If m = 1, stop: all on-ramp flows for the current time step have been determined.
5. Recalculate ∆n← max{0,∆n+ r1im(t)}.
6. Compute the reduction coefficient for the upstream entrance: γm−1 = min{1, (f1,sim (t)−r1im(t))/f1,eim−1}.
7. Set m← m− 1 and go to step 2.
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3.3 Theorems
We now prove that the presented controller keeps the toll lane in a free-flow state, if the minimum-queue-
growth-rate condition allows it. Moreover, even if the toll lane is initially congested, it becomes almost
uncongested in finite time.
The toll lane is considered as an independent system, and the upper index ξ = 1 is omitted for simplicity.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose n(t) ≤ ne and the inequality rim(t)+fdim−1(t) ≤ feim/βfim holds for all entrances im.
Then n(t+ 1) ≤ ne.
Proof. Note that for m > 1, nim−1(t) ≤ neim−1 and
fdim−1(t) ≤ feim−1 ≤ feim/βfim ,
therefore the inequality rim(t) + fdim−1(t) ≤ feim/βfim holds at least for rim(t) = 0.
Clearly, fi−1(t) = fdi−1(t) for i = 2, . . . ,K + 1, since fsi (t) = F si ≥ fei /βfi ≥ fei−1 ≥ fdi−1(t) if there is
no on-ramp in link i, and fsi (t) − ri(t) = F si − ri(t) ≥ fei /βfi − ri(t) ≥ fdi−1(t), otherwise. Therefore,
fi(t) + si(t) = f
d
i (t)/β
f
i = vini(t) for all i = 1, . . . ,K + 1. Additionally, fi−1(t) ≤ fei−1 ≤ fei /βfi if there is
no on-ramp in link i, and ri(t) + fi−1(t) ≤ fei /βfi , otherwise. Thus, if n(t) ≤ ne, then
ni(t+ 1) = ni(t) + fi−1(t) + ri(t)− fi(t)− si(t) ≤ ni(t)(1− vi) + fei /βfi ≤ nei (1− vi) + fei /βfi = nei
for all i.
This theorem means that if the state of the toll lane is in a “target zone” n(t) ≤ ne at time t, then it remains
there at time t + 1 if the on-ramp flow demand rd(t) isn’t too high and the general purpose lane isn’t too
congested near the entrances.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose n−(t) ≤ n+(t) and r−(t) ≤ r+(t). Then n−(t+ 1) ≤ n+(t+ 1).
A similar lemma is proved in [14].
Theorem 3.2. Suppose fe is an equilibrium flow, the inequalities
fim−1(t) + rim(t) ≤ feim/βfim , fsim(t) ≥ feim−1 (3.8)
hold for all links with on-ramps im for all t, and
im+1−1∑
i=im
ni(t) ≤
im+1−1∑
i=im
nei , m = 1, . . . ,M, (3.9)
for all t. Here nei = fei /(β
f
i vi).
Then for any ε > 0 there exists a time step T = T (ε) such that ni(t) ≤ nei +ε, i = 1, . . . ,K+1, for t ≥ T (ε).
Proof of Theorem 3.2 (Outline). First transform the system to get rid of the off-ramps. Multiply the “inflow
capacity” of the mainline link F si , the on-ramp capacity Ri, the maximum number of vehiclesNi, the incoming
flow di(t), the number of vehicles in mainline link ni(t) and on the on-ramp qi(t) by µi =
∏i−1
j=1(β
f
j )
−1.
15
Multiply the “outflow capacity” of the ith link F di by µi+1. For the transformed system denoted by ˆ the
following equations hold:
fˆdi−1(t) = min{vi−1nˆi−1(t), Fˆ di−1} = µifdi−1(t),
fˆsi (t) = min{wi(Nˆi − nˆi(t)), Fˆ si } = µifsi (t),
rˆdi (t) = min{vri qˆi(t), Rˆi} = µirdi (t).
Therefore, fˆi−1(t) = µifi−1(t), rˆi(t) = µiri(t), fˆi(t) = µi+1fi(t) = µifi(t)/β
f
i , thus nˆi(t + 1) = µini(t + 1),
qˆi(t + 1) = µiqi(t + 1). That is, the transformed system is equivalent to the initial system. Multiply the
equilibrium flow fei by µi+1. The inequalities fim−1(t) + rim(t) ≤ feim/βfim , fsim(t) ≥ feim−1 transform into
fˆim−1(t) + rˆim(t) ≤ fˆeim , fˆsim(t) ≥ fˆeim−1, while the inequality
∑im+1−1
i=im
ni(t) ≤
∑im+1−1
i=im
nei transforms into∑im+1−1
i=im
µ−1i nˆi(t) ≤
∑im+1−1
i=im
µ−1i nˆ
e
i . Hence, it suffices to show that the theorem holds for the freeway with
no off-ramps, but the inequality
∑im+1−1
i=im
ni(t) ≤
∑im+1−1
i=im
nei should be replaced with
im+1−1∑
i=im
αini(t) ≤
im+1−1∑
i=im
αin
e
i ,
where αi = µ−1i =
∏i−1
j=1 β
f
j . Note that 1 = α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αK+1 > 0.
Consider the links between two adjacent on-ramps. Consider the clusters of links with ni(t) > nei . It is easy
to show that the downstream boundary of a cluster can only move downstream, one cluster cannot split
into two or more, and new clusters cannot be created. So, starting from some point in time, the number of
clusters remains constant and their downstream boundaries are fixed.
Denote
hm(t) =
im+1−1∑
i=im
max{0, ni(t)− nei}.
We shall prove that hm(t)→ 0 as t→∞ for all m.
If there are no clusters between on-ramps m and m+ 1, then, clearly, hm = 0.
It is easily shown that hm(t) is decreasing and nonnegative, thus there exists limt→∞ hm(t) ≥ 0. Sup-
pose limt→∞ hm(t) = δ > 0. Let i∗m be the downstream boundary of the most upstream cluster be-
tween the on-ramps m and m + 1. Using lemma 3.1, it can be demonstrated that lim inft→∞ ni(t) ≥ nei ,
i = i∗m + 1, . . . , im+1− 1. Consider only those time steps where the number of clusters and their downstream
boundaries are stabilised (that is, do not change anymore) and nei − ηi ≤ ni(t) for some small ηi > 0, say,
ηi = δαim+1/(2(im+1− im)αi), i = i∗m+1, . . . , im+1−1. We now demonstrate that the most upstream cluster
disappears in finite time. Since hm(t) ≥ δ,
0 ≥
im−1∑
i=im
αi(ni(t)− nei ) =
=
∑
i<i∗m,
ni(t)≤nei
αi(ni(t)− nei ) +
∑
ni(t)>nei
αi(ni(t)− nei ) +
∑
i>i∗m,
ni(t)≤nei
αi(ni(t)− nei ) ≥
≥ αim
∑
i<i∗m,
ni(t)≤nei
(ni(t)− nei ) + δ −
im+1−1∑
i=im
αiηi = αim
∑
i<i∗m,
ni(t)≤nei
(ni(t)− nei ) + αim+1
δ
2
.
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Thus the following inequality holds:∑
i<i∗m,
ni(t)≤nei
(nei − ni(t)) ≥
δαim+1
2αim
. (3.10)
Consequently, at each time step t there exists i ∈ {im, . . . , i∗m − 1} such that
ni(t) ≤ nei −
δαim+1
2αim(i
∗
m − im)
.
This implies that oftener than every (i∗m − tm) steps the upstream cluster size will decrease by at least
βfim × . . .× βfi∗m−1 ×
δαim+1
2αim(i
∗
m − im)
= µ > 0.
Therefore, the upstream cluster exists at most dhm(t)(i∗m− im)/µe time steps. This contradicts our assump-
tion that the number of clusters is stabilized. Thus hm(t)→ 0 as t→ 0, which concludes the proof.
Remark 3.1. In theorem 3.2 it would be sufficient to require that the inequality 3.9
im+1−1∑
i=im
ni(t) ≤
im+1−1∑
i=im
nei
holds only asymptotically, that is,
lim sup
t→+∞
im+1−1∑
i=im
ni(t) ≤
im+1−1∑
i=im
nei .
The control algorithm attemps to satisfy the inequalities of theorem 3.2,
∑im+1−1
i=im
ni(t + 1) ≤
∑im+1−1
i=im
nei
and fim−1(t) + rim(t) ≤ feim/βfim , at step 3. If that is impossible, a reduction coefficient γm−1 is introduced
at step 6 to reduce the flow from upstream links. If the requirements if the theorem can be met, then the toll
lane becomes almost uncongested in finite time, that is, for arbitrarily small ε > 0 the density vector n1(t)
is component-wise less than n1,e + ε, starting from some time step t, regardless of the initial state.
Remark 3.2. The suggested controller calculates only split ratios for on-ramp flow r. However, this scheme
can be modified so, that mainline travelers are also allowed to change lanes, paying a toll if they change
from the general purpose to the toll lane. Since the controller keeps the toll lane less congested than general
purpose lane, only the travelers from the general purpose lane may want to change lanes. In this model the
split ratios of on-ramp flow r and the split ratios of flow f2 from general purpose lane both depend on the
price. The price for entering the toll lane should be the same for those drivers who come from on-ramps and
for those coming from the general purpose lane. For that reason the split ratios for on-ramp flow ri and the
split ratios for the flow from the general purpose lane f2i−1 are “paired”, since they are both defined by the
same price. The actual flows are defined by the generic node model presented in Subsection 2.1.
Some constraints, such as nonnegativity and boundedness, can be imposed on tolls. A toll is admissible if it
satisfies all constraints. To narrow the set of split ratios corresponding to admissible tolls we could introduce
additional requirements, for example, the minimization of queue length growth or the maximization of total
flow through the node. Then an algorithm similar to the one presented above can be applied at each time
step.
3.4 Examples
Consider a freeway with one on-ramp (in the first link) and no exits, except for the last link, (K + 1). All
links have equal capacities, free flow speeds and congestion speeds, but the last link, K + 1, is a bottleneck
with a lower capacity: F ξK+1 < F
ξ
K = F
ξ
K−1 = · · · = F ξ1 , ξ = 1, 2. The initial state of the freeway is an
equilibrium.
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Figure 8: Freeway with one entrance and one exit.
Scenario 1 Both the toll lane and the general-purpose lanes are uncongested from link 1 to some link i
and congested from link (i + 1) to link (K + 1). The incoming flow equals the bottleneck capacity: d0 =
F 1K+1 + F
2
K+1. The on-ramp flow r0 is redistributed in order to reduce congestion in the toll lane, but only
until there are uncongested links in the general purpose lane.
Scenario 1a: The number of uncongested links is too small for the toll lane to become fully uncongested:
i < (K + 1)/2. Figure 9 illustrates this case, the densities (in vehicles per mile) are color-coded.
Figure 9: Reducing congestion in the toll lane. Scenario 1a. Densities (in vehicles per mile).
Scenario 1b: The number of uncongested links is sufficiently large, i > (K + 1)/2, and the toll lane becomes
fully uncongested in finite time (Figure 10).
Scenario 2 Initially, the whole freeway is uncongested, the incoming flow d0 equals the bottleneck ca-
pacity F 1K+1 + F
2
K+1. At some point in time (t = 5 minutes), the incoming flow d0 exceeds the bottleneck
capacity and both the general purpose and the toll lanes become congested, but the congestion grows faster
in the general purpose lane. The toll lane still becomes partially congested, because the general purpose
lane alone cannot accommodate the whole excess flow: d0 > F 1K+1 +F
2
1 . Then (at time t = 30 minutes) the
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Figure 10: Reducing congestion in the toll lane. Scenario 1b. Densities (in vehicles per mile).
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incoming flow d0 drops to the bottleneck capacity and the congestion is transferred from the toll lane to the
general purpose lane. Figure 11 illustrates this scenario.
Figure 11: Temporarily infeasible incoming flow (scenario 2). Densities.
Now consider a freeway with two entrances (at the beginning and in the middle), and two exits (in the
middle and at the end), see Figure 12. The last link, K + 1, is a bottleneck. The priorities pξ,fi−1, ξ = 1, 2
and pri are equal to capacities: p
ξ,f
i−1 = β
f
i−1F
ξ
i−1, p
r
i = Ri.
q1
n
1
1
n
2
1
· · ·
n
1
i−1
n
2
i−1
qi
n
1
i
n
2
i
· · ·
n
1
K+1
n
2
K+1
Figure 12: Freeway with two entrances and two exits.
Scenario 3 Initially, the toll lane and the general purpose lane are in the same partially congested equi-
librium state. The incoming flow is feasible, but not strictly feasible. Flows from both on-ramps (at the
beginning and in the middle) are redistributed, and the toll lane decongests shifting the extra vehicles to the
general purpose lane.
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Figure 13: Reducing congestion in the toll lane of a freeway with two entrances (scenario 3). Densities.
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4 Tolls as Actuators
Now that at a given entrance i, the split ratio controller computed the desired values α1i and α2i , our goal is
to enforce them. It is done by setting the price for vehicles entering the toll lane. We consider two ways of
setting the price: (1) using the known Value of Time distribution; and (2) setting up an auction. These are
described next.
4.1 Value of Time Distribution
The Value of Time (VoT) is the marginal rate of substitution of travel time for money in a travelers’ indirect
utility function. In essence, this makes it the amount that a traveler would be willing to pay in order to save
time, or the amount he would accept as a compensation for the lost time. The VoT varies considerably from
traveler to traveler and depends upon the purpose of the journey. The estimation of the VoT was studied in
[28, 30, 2, 34].
We assume that the VoT distribution is known, ν(pi), where pi represents the price per time unit. For a given
entrance i, we find the desired price of the time unit, pi? from the equation∫ pi?
0
ν(pi)dpi = α2i . (4.1)
Figure 14 illustrates the VoT pricing mechanism.
Figure 14: Value of Time distribution — finding price per time unit pi.
To continuously estimate the VoT distribution, we need to know the difference in travel time between the
general purpose and the toll lanes, τ ; the number of vehicles in the general purpose lane, n2; the price set
for the toll lane, pi?τ ; and the amount of money collected, T , every certain time period.1 This will give us
enough information to infer the portion of travelers, whose VoT is higher or equal than pi?: n1 = Tpi?τ , and∫ ∞
pi?
ν(pi)dpi =
n1
n1 + n2
. (4.2)
1Time period should be in the order of minutes.
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Assuming price pi? varies, we could eventually, estimate ν(pi?). It is rather crude approach, since in different
time of day travelers’ VoT is different, but it conveys the idea.
In the case of HOT lanes, where besides paying customers there may be high occupancy vehicles, we would
need to know additionally the number of vehicles in the HOT lane, n1. Then, equation (4.2) is to be slightly
modified:∫ ∞
pi?
ν(pi)dpi =
T
pi?τ(n1 + n2)
. (4.3)
The main shortcoming of the VoT-based price setting is the difficulty of estimating the VoT distribution. If
the estimate is too rough, we may end up with underutilized, if the price is too high, or overly congested,
if the price is too low, toll lane, which will hinder the performance of the overall system reducing the total
output flow.
To reduce the inaccuracy of the VoT based toll calculation, the continuing calibration of the willingness to
pay must be performed. Such calibration would use a discrete choice model. Logit model based calibration
is described in [23, 22].
4.2 Auction
The alternative method of setting the price for a toll lane is an auction. The auction based scheme applied to
a cordon area congestion pricing was described in [32]. Here we describe the auction mechanism for managed
toll lane based on the idea of [13]. At time t, at the entrance i, H = rdi (t) travelers make bids b1, . . . , bH .
Without loss of generality, we assume b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bH . Let h? = round(α1iH). Vehicles with bids b1, . . . , bh?
will be let into the toll lane, and each of them will pay bh? generating bh?h? total revenue for the entrance i
at time t.
The main advantage of the auction approach is its deterministic outcome: for each decision point i, we can
achieve the desired split ratio coefficients α1i , α2i exactly.
The suggested auction mechanism allows variations. For instance, parameter h? may be chosen maximizing
the revenue without compromising the quality of service:
h? = arg max
h≤α1iH
hbh.
At the time of this writing, the deployment of an auction as a mechanism for setting tolls presents certain
technical difficulties. In the coming years, however, the active development of cooperative taxis, connected
and autonomous vehicles and wireless communications will enable passengers to determine the amount they
would be ready to spend reducing their travel time at the start or during the trip. Thus, the auction
mechanism for buying a place in the toll lane guaranteeing the required time saving may become realistic
and practical.
5 Application: Interstate 680 South in California
In 2013-14 Caltrans2 conducted a Corridor System Management Plan (CSMP) study for the Interstate 680
corridor in Contra Costa County [4]. Certain improvements were considered, including ramp metering,
2California Department of Transportation
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adding auxiliary lanes and, notably, converting existing HOV lanes to HOT.3 Modeling of improvement
scenarios was done at UC Berkeley PATH using simulation Tools for Operational Planning (TOPL) [33].
In this Section we present the simulation for a 10-mile segment of I-680 South corridor extending from
Martinez through Concord and Pleasant Hill to Walnut Creek, shown in Figure 15. It goes from postmile
56 to postmile 46. An HOV lane spans most of this segment. The start and end of the HOV lane are shown
on the map.
Figure 15: Map of the simulated I-680S corridor.
The data collection effort of the CSMP project revealed a severe bottleneck during the AM peak hours
located near the end of the HOV lane. This bottleneck generates large congestion in the GP lane, while the
HOV lane stays in free flow and is underutilized.
A macroscopic CTM-based simulation model for the I-680 corridor was built and calibrated using TOPL
and measurement data collected in the CSMP study. Three scenarios were simulated:
1. base case that reproduces existing conditions;
3HOV lane is a lane for High Occupancy Vehicles. Typical minimum vehicle occupancy level for HOV lanes in the U.S. is 2
(2+HOV) or sometimes 3 (3+HOV). Presently, I-680 corridor has 2+HOV lanes. HOT stands for High Occupancy or Tolled.
HOT lane is free for HOVs, others must pay a toll.
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Figure 16: Simulation speed contours of the AM peak. Three cases are considered: base case, or what is
currently observed with an existing HOV lane; a case when an HOV lane is treated as GP; and a case when
an HOV lane is converted to HOT. Speed is given in miles per hour.
2. HOV lane as GP that shows how the corridor would perform if the HOV lane were treated as an extra
GP lane; and
3. HOV lane as HOT, where the HOT lane was modeled instead of the HOV lane using the controller
described in this paper.
Whereas the first scenario represents the reality, scenarios 2 and 3 are hypothetical and were explored as
part of the planning exercise. The input demand was assumed the same in all three scenarios. Morning peak
hours were simulated: from 5 to 10 AM. This is when travelers currently experience large delays at that
segment of I-680S.
Speed contour maps resulting from the three simulations are shown in Figure 16. Contours on the left show
the speed dynamics in the GP lane, and contours on the right correspond to the special lane, which in
scenario 1 is HOV, in scenario 2 is GP and in scenario 3 is HOT. Black stripes on the left and on the right
of the special lane contours correspond to locations, where there is no special lane. Tables 1 and 2 contain
Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT) and delay values from the simulated scenarios.
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Case GP lane VMT Special lane VMT Total VMT
Base case with existing HOV lane 22502 2742 25244
Special lane is treated as GP 21087 4157 25244
HOV lane is converted to HOT 21925 3319 25244
Table 1: Vehicle Miles Traveled in the period from 5 to 10 AM in the three simulated cases.
Case GP lane delay Special lane delay Total delay
Base case with existing HOV lane 250 0 277
Special lane is treated as GP 77 14 91
HOV lane is converted to HOT 75 2 77
Table 2: Vehicle-hours of delay in the period from 5 to 10 AM in the three simulated cases. Total delay in
the last column includes delay from on-ramp queues, which exists only in the base case.
In the base case scenario we observe large congestion in the GP lane, while the HOV lane has no congestion
at all. Opening the HOV lane to everyone (scenario 2) helps a lot, as is evident from the delay table
(Table 2), but congestion is not eliminated completely, and now both GP and HOV lanes have the same
congestion pattern, so travelers have no mode choice. Not surprisingly, the HOT lane scenario shows the
best performance of the three both in congestion mitigation and keeping the special lane as free as possible.
One interesting detail to notice is the slight reduction of the GP lane delay in scenario 3 compared to scenario
2. That happens despite the fact that the GP lane has more vehicles in scenario 3 than in scenario 2 (Table
1). This happens because the HOT controller try to keep the flow in the GP lane as close to capacity as
possible, and thus more vehicles travel with higher speed.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we described the toll lane control algorithm for freeways in the context of the link-node CTM
with the modified node model. Its design was presented in two stages: (1) the supply control computing the
desired split ratios for the incoming flows with the goal of keeping the toll lane in free flow as long as and as
much as possible, yet fully utilized; and (2) the demand control, setting the price so that the flows between
the toll and the general purpose lanes were distributed according to the computed split ratios.
We described the equilibrium of the traffic model and pointed out that activating the toll lane is meaningful
only in the partially congested equilibrium, when the general purpose lane has enough storage space to
accommodate extra vehicles from the toll lane without reducing the total output flow of the system. In free
flow state with feasible demand there is obviously no need for the toll lane, as it does not provide the benefit
of the shorter travel time. When the freeway is in the fully congested equilibrium, the deployment of a toll
lane is not recommended either, as it can only harm the overall system performance by oversaturating the
general purpose lane, creating queues at entrances and reducing the total output flow of the system.
The split ratio control algorithm presented in the paper behaves as follows:
• in free flow state with feasible demand it is essentially non-active letting the mainline operate as one
piece;
• in the case of infeasible demand, the excess flow is directed into the general purpose lane, letting it to
congest first;
• once the general purpose lane is fully congested, the algorithm lets the toll lane to congest;
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• if it comes to the point when the toll lane is fully congested, the algorithm is deactivated, as there is
nothing it can improve at this point, so the mainline returns back to one piece;
• once the demand drops again, and the freeway starts to decongest, the algorithm first brings the toll
lane into the free flow state, and then the general purpose lane.
All these manipulations with flows are done through split ratios at the end nodes of the entrance links. The
control algorithm computes these split ratios.
The split ratio control algorithm can be extended to the case of HOT lanes. For that, however, one has to
introduce and deal with multiple vehicle types, as described in [18]. In this case, two vehicle types will be
needed: High Occupancy Vehicles (HOVs) and Single Occupancy Vehicles (SOVs). The HOV flow won’t be
controlled, but will be governed by the algorithm of finding the path of the least resistance,4 presented in
[18], whereas the SOVs will be subject to the toll control, and the available space in the general purpose and
the HOT lanes will be computed accounting for both vehicle types.
Finally, we discussed two mechanisms for price setting — the VoT distribution and the auction. The former
is commonly used, but provides only rough estimates of the actual traveler behavior, resulting mostly in the
underutilization or oversaturation of the toll lane. The latter mechanism is hardly deployable at current time
due to technical difficulties, but in the foreseeable future with the emerging technologies, especially, those of
autonomous vehicles and ride shares, it looks promising.
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